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Abstract:
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and the total amount of TV advertising. A softening of price competition in each product
market results in more investment in programming, higher price per advertising slot, and
more advertising. A reduction of the number of firms in each product market may have
the opposite effect if the price competition in the product market is sufficiently soft
initially. Finally, we find that even small asymmetries between product markets can cause
large asymmetries with respect to which producers buy advertising on TV.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The television industry is often referred to as part of the entertainment business. In that
respect, it is an important industry, for example in terms of the time people spend
watching TV.1 However, it is also important as a transmitter of advertising for producers
in the product markets.2  The purpose of this article is to investigate the two-fold role of
television, both as a provider of entertainment and as a transmitter of advertising. Our
main focus is on the interplay between the TV market and the product markets through
the market for advertising. We examine how the rivalry between TV channels and the
profit potential in the product markets affect TV channels’ prices on advertising slots,
their investments in programming, and the producers’ purchase of advertising on TV.
Despite the important role of the TV industry, there are relatively few studies of
this particular industry in the economics literature. The studies that do exist typically
focus on how rivalry between TV channels affects program diversity.3 With a few notable
exceptions, the choice of advertising on TV is not taken into consideration.4 One of the
                                                          
1See, for example, Robinson and Godbey (1999).
2The amounts spent on TV advertising are significant. In one survey, TV advertising in the US amounted to
$ 41.1 billion, out of a total advertising of $ 79.5 billion; i.e., more than half of all advertising (see
http://adage.com/dataplace/archives/dp394.html). In another survey, TV advertising in the US was
projected to $ 52 billion, 39 % of total advertising (see http://adage.com/dataplace/topmarkets/).  According
to the latter survey, TV’s share of total advertising varies considerably between countries. While its share is
60 % in Brazil, its share of total advertising is only 23 % in Germany.
3Steiner (1952), focusing on radio broadcasting, was concerned about whether competing radio stations
would air identical type of programs at the same time.  For elaborations on his model, see Owen and
Wildman (1992).  Spence and Owen (1977) use a model of monopolistic competition to compare the
program diversity of pay-TV and advertising-financed TV. In Nilssen and Sørgard (1998), a TV duopoly
where TV channels choose both programs' contents and their time scheduling is discussed. Empirical
studies of program diversity, such as Rust and Eechambadi (1989), Rust et al. (1992), Goettler (1999), and
Goettler and Shachar (1999), primarily focus on how to estimate the viewers’ demand for TV programs and
the implications for TV stations’ program choice; see also Berry and Waldfogel (1999) on radio
broadcasting.
4Zhou (1999) examines the timing of commercial breaks in a monopoly as well as a duopoly TV industry.
However, he does not model the producers’ choice of advertising. Grossman and Shapiro (1984), on the
other hand, do model the producers’ choice of advertising. But in neither of these models are the TV
channels’ choices of advertising space and price of advertising analyzed.  In Nilssen and Sørgard (2000),
2notable exceptions is Anderson and Coate (2000).5 Their study relates closely to the
existing literature on program diversity, since they analyze a TV channel’s choice
between two types of programs.  They view advertising as a link between the product
markets and the TV market, and their main concern is the market’s ability to provide an
efficient outcome. On the one hand, viewers dislike commercial breaks. On the other
hand, viewers, as consumers, receive information about new products from
advertisements on TV. They find that the market in some cases leads to under-provision
of advertisements and/or programming and in some cases to over-provision.
Another exception is Motta and Polo (1997a). They examine how TV channels’
investments in programming to attract viewers affect the structure in the TV market. In
line with Sutton (1991), they find that, even in a large market, the number of TV channels
can be limited in a free-entry equilibrium. The reason is that a large market size triggers
intense rivalry in programming and thereby a high endogenous fixed cost per firm.
Our model encompasses the two-fold role of television, as is the case in the
models introduced in Anderson and Coate (2000) and Motta and Polo (1997a). However,
our study is different from theirs in many other respects. One important distinction
between our model and Anderson and Coate’s (2000) model is that we let investments in
programming be a choice variable. Although our model approach thus is much more
closely related to Motta and Polo (1997a), it still has a focus distinctly different from
theirs. We examine how product-market competition affects the equilibrium outcome in
the TV industry.  The profit potential in the product market depends on the toughness of
                                                                                                                                                                            
the model introduced in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) is extended to take into account rivalry between TV
stations on the price of advertising.
5Gabszewicz et al. (2000) is another notable exception, and it shares many similarities with the modeling
approach in Anderson and Coate (2000). They introduce advertising in a Hotelling-type model of the TV
3price competition, the number of producers, as well as other factors.6 Motta and Polo
(1997a) do not raise this issue, nor do Anderson and Coate (2000). In addition, we
examine the interplay between several product markets, another issue not raised neither
in Motta and Polo (1997a) nor in Anderson and Coate (2000).
A basic feature in our model is that viewers are attracted to a TV channel that
invests in programming, but they dislike TV advertising. A TV channel, on the other
hand, earns its revenues by selling advertising slots to producers in the product market
and attracts viewers for this advertising by investing in programming. The producers in
the product markets expand sales by advertising. Clearly, then, advertising is the link
between the TV market and the product markets. Since an increase in the amount of
advertising tends to reduce the number of TV viewers, there are diminishing returns to
TV advertising. In addition, there is congestion in TV advertising: The more one producer
advertises its own products on a particular TV channel, the fewer viewers are available
there for other producers to advertise to.
The TV channels set the amounts of programming investment and the prices (or
quantities) of advertising, while the producers determine their demand for advertising and
the product price. There are, however, numerous questions that arise when we try to
model the TV industry, questions that have not been discussed in the existing literature.
                                                                                                                                                                            
industry. Each TV firm chooses a program which consists of a mix of entertainment and culture. In contrast
to our model, neither the product market nor the programming investment is explicitly modeled.
6Sutton (1991) shows, both theoretically and empirically, that the structure in advertising-intensive
industries differs from other industries. In particular, the endogenous nature of advertising results in high
fixed costs and thereby a limited number of firms. [See also Robinson and Chang (1996).] This suggests
that the products markets in question here have a limited number of active firms. In fact, among the top ten
advertisers on network TV in the US in 1999, there are three automobile producers (GM, Ford and
DaimlerChrysler) and five producers of dominant brands in consumer goods industries such as, for
example, cosmetics and beer (Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson, Philip Morris, Unilever and
Diageo). On spot TV in the US, six out of the top ten advertisers are automobile firms.  See the data
reported on http://adage.com/dataplace/archives. This suggests that the major advertisers on TV are
4For example, it is not clear (i) whether the TV channels set the quantity or price of
advertising, nor (ii) whether advertising is priced per slot or per viewer. In Section 2,
where we present our model and its equilibrium, we therefore also report how different
assumptions affect the equilibrium outcomes and the interaction between different choice
variables (strategic substitutes versus strategic complements). This enables us to better
understand the implications of some idiosyncratic characteristics in the TV industry.
Among the results reported in this section, we find that advertising in the two TV
channels are either complementary goods for the advertisers (if advertising is priced per
slot) or independent goods (if advertising is priced per viewer). In the former case, TV
channels’ prices of advertising are strategic substitutes, while if TV channels choose
quantities and/or advertising is priced per viewer, then TV channels’ strategic variables
are strategic complements. Interestingly, we find that a TV channel’s two strategic
variables, programming investment and either price or quantity, always reinforce each
other: Increasing one also increases the marginal profit with respect to the other. The
outcome is that, when the price of advertising is high, so is also investment in
programming. In all cases that we consider, the positive effect of the latter on the demand
for advertising dominates the negative effect of the former, so that also advertising is
high when the price of advertising is high. Advertising and programming investments are
the highest when advertising is priced per slot and TV channels compete in prices.
In Sections 3 to 5, we apply the model to investigate three different issues. We
start out, in Section 3, by asking how rivalry in the TV market affects the equilibrium
outcome. This is done by analyzing the transition from monopoly to duopoly. We find
                                                                                                                                                                            
dominant firms in what we typically characterize as oligopolistic industries. In line with this, we find it
plausible to assume strategic interaction in the product markets that we model.
5that adding a TV channel may actually decrease the amount of TV advertising as well as
the total number of viewers. This happens when, in a duopoly situation, viewer leakage
between the TV channels is large.
In Section 4, we ask how product-market competition affects the equilibrium
outcome. A change in product market competition can come about through either a
change in the number of firms in a market or a change in market conduct. In our model,
the two interact: We find that an increase in the number of firms in each product market
decreases advertising when producers compete in quantities but increases advertising
when producers collude.
Finally, in Section 5, we ask how the existence of several product markets affects
the TV industry. We analyze a case of two product markets that differ with respect to the
number of firms in each. We find that, in equilibrium, the firms operating in the less
concentrated, and thus less profitable, profit market find advertising so unprofitable that
they choose to abstain from advertising altogether, leaving advertising to the firms in the
more profitable product market.
In Section 6, we summarize our results and point to some issues for future
research. Proofs not given in the text are collected in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM
Consider n advertising firms and a TV industry with two TV channels, where n ≥ 2.7 The
n advertising firms may or may not belong to the same product market. For now, we
                                                          
7For some of our results, we need to extend our model, in a straightforward way, to the case of a single-
channel TV monopoly.
6assume only that the product markets are identical, so that firms are symmetric in terms
of their gains from advertising.
There are at least two issues concerning the modeling of competition between TV
channels. The first one is already a classic one in the modern theory of industrial
organization: Do TV channels compete in the market for TV advertising by choosing
quantities or prices? A quick look at any commercial TV station's programming may
indicate that the quantity of advertising on a channel is restricted by the programs being
aired there. If, for example, a TV channel transmits a series of 25-minute sit-coms during
an evening, there will only be time for 5 minutes of advertising per half-hour. Such a
capacity constraint points, along the lines suggested by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
and Tirole (1988), in the direction of treating the quantity of advertising as the actual
decision variable for a TV channel. On the other hand, there are also other programs on
any TV station's schedule where the quantity of advertising is much more flexible. For
example, when transmitting newscasts and sports events, the TV station may be able to
put on air large quantities of advertising. In order to accommodate a small amount of
advertising sold, a TV channel can fill in with advertising for its own programs.8 This
points in the direction of letting the price of advertising be a TV channel's decision
variable, with its quantity of advertising being determined by how much it can sell at its
chosen price. In line with this reasoning, we assume that the TV channels set prices of
advertising. However, in the discussion of the model in this Section, we also explore the
effects of letting quantity rather than price being the decision variable.
                                                          
8Such advertising for own programs are called "tune-ins". According to Shachar and Anand (1998), tune-
ins constituted about one-sixth of total advertising on US TV networks in 1995.
7The second modeling issue is more idiosyncratic to the TV industry: What is the
unit of pricing of advertising? One argument would be that the TV channels are able to
keep records of how many viewers any program has. This is done through viewer meters
that record, for a sample of the population, which programs are watched. These records
are then used to determine how much advertisers will have to pay for the advertising they
purchase on a TV channel. These concerns make it important to include, in our initial
analysis, the case of advertising being priced per viewer. At the same time, however,
there are reasons to believe that this recording has its limitations. In fact, it has been
reported that TV channels have not been able to set a price per viewer of advertising.9
When this is the case, it is closer to the more standard flavor where price is set per
advertising slot. We therefore assume, later on, that the TV channels set a price per
advertising slot. However, when presenting the model in this Section, we explore the
effects of the two alternative assumptions: letting the firms set the price of advertising
either per viewer or per slot.
Other aspects of our model are more straightforward, such as the sequencing of
decisions. It is crucial that TV viewers make their decisions knowing the benefit they
gain from each TV channel. Thus, TV channels' programming decisions, as well as
advertising firms' advertising decisions, are made before TV viewers make their choices
in our model. At the same time, the effect of advertising on the product markets is only
felt after the advertising has been actually aired and watched by the viewers-consumers.
Thus, product-market competition takes place after the TV viewers' decisions are made.
                                                          
9According to Goettler (1999), a typical contract between an advertiser and a TV channel specifies the
prices to be paid for an advertising slot and minimum guaranteed ratings. When the guaranteed ratings are
not attained, the advertiser’s ad is aired later, in another show.  However, the additional ad slot is typically
aired on a less popular show and does not fully compensate advertisers.
8Finally, we will assume that the advertising firms make their decisions about how much
to advertise on each channel only after the TV channels have committed, not only their
programming investments, but also to their prices (or quantities) of advertising. These
considerations give rise to the following four-stage game:
Stage 1: Each TV-channel chooses its price (or quantity) of advertising and its
investments in programming.
Stage 2: Each producer determines how much to advertise in each TV channel.
Stage 3: Each viewer decides whether or not to watch TV and, if so, which TV
channel to watch.
Stage 4: The producers compete in the product market.
For the sake of analytical simplicity, we will represent a TV channel’s decision on
programming investments by the resulting attractiveness of the channel’s programs. We
will denote our measure of attractiveness by quality, in line with Motta and Polo (1997a)
and Sutton (1991), although there is arguably only a weak connection between the
popularity and the quality of TV programs.10
Since we are interested in finding the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game,
we proceed by backward induction and start out with describing and analyzing stage 4.
Stage 4: The product market
In Section 4, we will discuss the product market in detail.  For the moment, let us simply
assume that a firm's profits, gross of advertising costs, are proportional to its level of
advertising. Thus, in our model, there are constant returns to scale in advertising when
                                                          
10 A different approach is taken by Cabizza and De Fraja (1998), who let quality be a measure of the
regulator’s taste for the programming, rather than of its popularity among viewers.
9the product market is viewed in isolation.  As will be clear shortly, diminishing returns to
advertising are introduced through the effect of advertising on TV viewers' behavior.
Let firm i's advertising on channel k be denoted aik. Define Zik as firm i's gross
profit per viewer of channel k. The assumption we will stick to throughout is that the
effect of advertising is multiplicatively separable from the other effects. To start with, we
also assume that those other effects are the same for all advertising firms. In particular,
we assume, for now, that there exists some K > 0 such that:
Zik = Kaik, (1)
While we, in this section and the next, simply assume (1) to hold, we will, in Section 4,
present a model of the product markets with the property that (1) holds in equilibrium.
Later on, in Section 5, we will allow K to differ across product markets, although not
across firms in the same market.
Stage 3: The viewers
At stage 3, viewers decide whether or not to watch a TV channel. A typical viewer is
attracted by the quality of TV programs but dislikes commercial breaks.11  In line with
this, we assume that a channel's number of viewers is increasing (decreasing) in own
(rival) program quality and decreasing (increasing) in own (rival) number of advertising
slots.
Let qk denote program quality in channel k. Moreover, define total advertising on
                                                          
11It is documented that viewers try to escape from advertising breaks, see, e.g., Moriarty and Everett (1994)
and Danaher (1995). In this respect, TV advertising may be distinctly different from advertising in other
media. In particular, readers may actively look for certain advertisements in newspapers or magazines.
Accordingly, Häckner and Nyberg (2000), in their analysis of the newspaper industry, assume that
newspaper readers like advertising. Other analyses of media valued by their consumers for their advertising
include Rysman (2000) on Yellow Pages, and Baye and Morgan (1999) on information gateways on the
Internet.
10
channel k as αk := .∑i ika  We specify the following audience function for TV channel k,
i.e., the channel's number of viewers:12
vk = [qk - αk] - d[qh - αh],   b > 0, d ∈ (0, 1),  k, h ∈ {1, 2}, k ≠ h.    (2)
The parameter d captures the extent to which viewers switch TV channel because of a
difference in the net program quality, q - α. In the case of a TV monopoly, the number of
viewers for the single channel is given by the expression in (2), with d = 0.
Note that our audience function, where an increase in advertising reduces a
channel's number of viewers, introduces diminishing returns to a producer's advertising:
The more a firm advertises on a TV channel, the fewer viewers the channel has, and the
lower gross profits the firm earns. But this also creates a congestion effect from
advertising: The reduction in the number of viewers caused by one firm’s advertising
affects negatively not only this firm but also other firms advertising on the same TV
channel.
Stage 2: Producers choose advertising
At stage 2, the producers in the product markets decide how much to advertise on each
TV channel. This is a special kind of congestion game between the advertisers: When one
advertiser increases its advertising on a TV channel, this will reduce the number of
viewers on this channel for all its advertisers. Moreover, since viewers may switch
between the TV channels as a result of differences in net quality, an advertiser may help
its own (and all other advertisers') advertising on one channel by increasing its
                                                          
12This audience function resembles, and is inspired by, the one in Motta and Polo (1997a). Theirs, unlike
ours, is derived from a discrete-choice model of viewer behavior. Their formulation is, however, not
analytically tractable for a number of our purposes.
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advertising on the other channel. This causes advertising on the two channels to be
complementary goods − but only when advertising is priced per slot. We have:13
Proposition 1: The demand for advertising.
(i) If advertising is priced per slot, then advertising on the two channels are
complementary goods for the advertising firms, and advertising demand at
each TV channel is a decreasing function of the two channels’ prices per
advertising slot.
(ii) If advertising is priced per viewer, then advertising on the two channels
are independent goods for the advertising firms, and advertising demand at
each TV channel is an increasing function of the channel’s price of
advertising per viewer.
Proof: (i) Let rk denote the price per advertising slot charged by channel k. Producer i has
the following maximization problem at stage 2:
( )∑∑∑
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Total gross profits are the per-capita gross profits times the number of viewers. Producer
i's advertising on the two channels is determined by the following first-order conditions:
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−i,k  = ∑ ≠ij jka .
                                                          
13In all cases with symmetric producers, as they are here, we will resort to analyzing symmetric equilibria.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, this gives rise to a system of two equations, which we
solve for a producer's demand for advertising in each channel. We find that a producer's
demand for advertising space is determined by the TV channels' program quality and
advertising prices in the following way:
,
)1(1
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a hkkk  k, h ∈ {1, 2}, (4)
where ak denotes a producer's demand for advertising on channel k. From this expression,
we see that advertising on one channel is complementary to advertising on the other, and
demand is decreasing in the prices.
(ii) Let ρk be the price charged by channel k per viewer from each advertiser.
Now, producer i solves the problem:
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Proceeding as above, this gives rise to the following demand for advertising on channel k:
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1
1
(5)
Thus, the demand for advertising in one channel is independent of the price of advertising
per viewer on the other channel, and demand is increasing in own price. QED.
Because of symmetry, total advertising on channel k is simply
 αk := nak, k ∈ {1, 2}, (6)
where the proper expression to be inserted for ak depends on how advertising is priced.
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To see why advertising in the two channels are complements when advertising is
priced per slot, note that an increase in the advertising price of one channel will decrease
the amount of advertising there. This decrease in advertising makes the channel more
attractive for viewers, and some viewers move over from the other channel. This
reduction in the number of viewers on the other channel leads to a reduction in
advertising in that channel as well.
Notice from (5) that, when advertising pricing is per viewer, demand appears to
be increasing in the price. However, in this case, we have a decision variable on the
demand side that does not match the unit of pricing. If a TV channel's price of advertising
per viewer increases, then each advertiser would like to decrease his advertising on this
channel, in terms of viewers watching the advertising. But in order to do this, the
advertiser must act so as to decrease the number of viewers of its advertising, and the
way to obtain such a decrease is by advertising more. Thus, an increase in the price of
advertising per viewer leads to an increase in the demand for advertising.
This increase in advertising on one channel, following an increase in its
advertising price per viewer, makes some of the viewers switch over to the other channel.
However, this increase in viewers of the other channel induces an increase in the
advertising in that channel in order for advertisers to get the number of viewers down to
the level that they demand. The outcome of this regression is in equation (5) above. With
advertising being priced per viewer, the effect on the TV audience of advertising is
totally internalized in the price. This leaves advertising on one channel unaffected by
both the other channel's advertising price, and the extent to which viewers switch
channels when faced with differences in net quality, as measured by d.
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In the case of a one-channel TV monopoly, the demand for advertising space on
the only TV channel present is found, in the case of advertising being priced per slot,
from the expression in (4) by putting d = 0. In the other case, advertising being priced per
viewer, the demand is unrelated to d, and therefore the expression in (5) applies to the
monopoly case as it is.
Stage 1: TV channels choose advertising prices and programming investments
A TV channel’s profit is the difference between its revenue from advertising and its
investments in programming. The latter is modeled as a cubic function of the program
quality.14 TV channel k’s problem at Stage 1 is to maximize its profits with respect to its
programming and its other strategic variable, either the quantity or the price of
advertising.
The concepts of strategic complements and strategic substitutes, introduced by
Bulow et al. (1985), are useful for understanding the nature of the competition in a
market. Let TV channel k's profit be denoted Hk and a generic strategic variable for the
TV channels be denoted uk. The TV channels' us are strategic complements if channel k's
marginal profits with respect to uk is increasing in uh, k ≠ h, formally, if ∂2Hk/∂uk∂uh > 0,
and they are strategic substitutes if the opposite relation holds, i.e., if ∂2Hk/∂uk∂uh < 0. In
most textbook models, prices are strategic complements and quantities are strategic
substitutes [see, e.g., Tirole (1988)]. This is not so in the present model. We have:
                                                          
14This appears to be the simplest specification ensuring interior equilibrium levels of programming
investments; in particular, a quadratic function is not convex enough.  The cubic programming investment
function is also used by Motta and Polo (1997a).
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Proposition 2: Strategic variables − prices and quantities
(i) If advertising is priced per slot, then advertising prices are strategic
substitutes and advertising quantities are strategic complements.
(ii) If advertising is priced per viewer, then both advertising prices and
advertising quantities are strategic complements.
Proof: (i) In this case, advertising is priced per slot. The profit of TV channel k, k ∈ {1,
2}, is:
3
3
k
kkk
q
rH −= α . (7)
Suppose first that TV channels set prices in addition to program quality. From (4) and
(6), we find TV channel k's residual demand for advertising as:
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Inserting this into (7) and differentiating, we find that:
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Suppose next that TV channels set quantities of advertising in addition to program
quality. The prices of advertising are those that clear the market, i.e. r1 and r2 must solve:
αk = nak, k ∈ {1, 2}, with ak given in (4). Thus, channel k's inverse residual demand for
advertising is:
( ) ( )


−
+
−−= hkhkk n
n
dqqKr αα
1
, k, h ∈ {1, 2}. (8)
Inserting this into (7) and differentiating, we now have:
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(ii) In this case, advertising is priced per viewer, and the advertising price of TV
channel k is denoted ρk. First, let us suppose that TV channels set prices in addition to
program qualities. From (2), (5), and (6), we find how a TV channel's audience depends
on the TV channels' prices and program qualities:
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With advertising priced per viewer, channel k's profit in this case equals:
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Inserting (9) into this expression and differentiating, we have:
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Suppose next that TV channels set advertising quantities rather than prices. Now,
the advertising prices per viewer at the two channels are such that the market for
advertising clears; i.e., ρ1 and ρ2 must solve: αk = nak, k ∈ {1, 2}, with ak now given in
(5). We obtain:
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Inserting (2) and (11) into (10) and differentiating, we have:
( )
0
12
>
+
=
∂∂
∂
n
dnKH
hk
k
ρρ
. QED.
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We know from Proposition 1(i) that advertising in the two channels are
complementary goods when advertising is priced per slot. This feature of the competition
between the TV channels in the price-per-slot case explains why prices are strategic
substitutes and quantities are strategic complements in that case.15
When advertising is priced per viewer, on the other hand, the demand for
advertising in the two channels is independent. This has the effect that a TV channel’s
gross revenue is independent of whether the TV channels compete in prices or in
quantities. Naturally, the two strategic variables have the same property in this case. It
also follows that price and quantity competition in this case produces exactly the same
equilibrium outcome, an observation that simplifies the subsequent analysis of this case.
An interesting feature of the model is that a TV channel’s two strategic variables
reinforce each other: An increase in one makes it profitable for the TV channel also to
increase the other.
Proposition 3: Strategic variables − reinforcement
A TV channel’s two strategic variables are reinforcing each other, i.e.,
,0
2
>
∂∂
∂
kk
k
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H
  k ∈ {1, 2},
where uk ∈ {rk, ρk, qk}, depending on what is the TV channel’s other strategic variable in
addition to program quality.
Proof: Follows from straightforward differentiations in each case. QED.
                                                          
15Results on strategic substitutes and strategic complements are regularly reversed when we have
complementary rather than substitute products. In particular, with price competition and complementary
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To illustrate the mechanism reported in the Proposition, consider the case of a
positive, exogenous shift in the total number of viewers in the TV market. This would
trigger more investment in programming in each TV channel in order to capture a larger
share of the viewers and then, in turn a larger share of the advertising on TV. By also
increasing the price per advertising slot (or per viewer), each TV channel can then
increase both the quantity and the price of advertising.
The equilibrium outcome can, in each of the cases considered here, be found by
solving the system of first-order conditions for the two channels. Details of this
calculation and the various equilibrium expressions can be found in the Appendix
(Proposition A1). Here, we note some overall features of the equilibrium outcomes.
The equilibrium variables of interest are:16 the price of advertising, whether it is
per slot, r, or per viewer, ρ; the programming investment of each TV channel,
represented by the program quality, q; the quantity of advertising on each channel, α; the
number of viewers on each channel, v; the profits earned by each TV channel, H; and the
profits earned by each advertiser, π. While prices are not comparable, the other variables
are, whether advertising is priced per slot or per viewer and whether TV channels
compete in prices or in quantities. Define X := {q, α, v, H, π} as this list of comparable
variables. Let a subscript, V or S, denote whether advertising is priced per viewer (V) or
per advertising slot (S); and let a superscript, P or Q, denote whether TV channels
compete in prices or in quantities.
                                                                                                                                                                            
products, prices are typically strategic substitutes. For more details, see Vives (1999, Section 6.3).
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Proposition 4: Comparing outcomes.
(i) All comparable variables are higher when advertising is priced per slot,
than when it is priced per viewer: zV
z
S xx > , x ∈ X, z ∈ {P, Q}.
(ii) If advertising is priced per slot, then all variables are higher when TV
channels compete in prices, than when they compete in quantities: rP > rQ
and QS
P
S xx > , x ∈ X.
(iii) If advertising is priced per viewer, then the equilibrium outcome is
unaffected by whether TV channels compete in prices or in quantities: ρP
= ρQ and QV
P
V xx = , x ∈ X.
Proof: Follows from straightforward comparisons of expressions in Proposition A1 in the
Appendix. QED.
Note that it is not clear how the choice variables or the choice of pricing schedule
affect the toughness of competition between the TV channels. To illustrate this, take the
case where advertising is priced per slot. Both prices per advertising slot as well as
investment in programming are higher with price setting than with quantity setting. Thus,
price setting results in more intense rivalry on programming and less intense rivalry on
prices per slot of advertising than what is the case with quantity setting.
                                                                                                                                                                            
16Again, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium.
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3. COMPARING TV MONOPOLY AND TV DUOPOLY
An important policy issue in broadcasting in many countries is whether to allow further
entry into the TV industry by advertising-financed TV stations. Our model is suitable for
performing an analysis of the effects of such an entry. In order to illustrate this, we
discuss here how a TV monopoly fares relative to a TV duopoly. The TV monopoly we
focus on is one with one TV channel.17 Moreover, we stick, from now on, to the
assumption that TV channels set prices per advertising slot.
We introduce subscripts M and D to capture the distinction between a TV
monopoly (M) and a TV duopoly (D): αs, qs, vs, and Hs (As, Qs, Vs, and THs) denote
equilibrium per-channel (total) spending on advertising, program quality (representing
investments in programming), total viewer attendance, and TV-channel profit,
respectively, in the industry, when the TV market structure is s, s ∈ {M, D}. Moreover,
let rs denote equilibrium price per advertising slot, s ∈ {M, D}. Finally, each producer's
gross profit per channel (in total) is denoted πs (Πs), s ∈ {M, D}. Note that, in the
duopoly case, AD = 2αD, QD = 2qD, VD = 2vD, THD = 2HD, and ΠD = 2πD.
It is straightforward to establish that a TV monopolist sets a higher price, invests
more in programming, obtains more advertising and more viewers, and earns more profit,
than does each TV duopolist. However, in assessing the two TV-market structures, what
we need to know is whether total programming investment, advertising, and so on, is
higher in a monopoly than in a duopoly. We have:
                                                          
17This seems the relevant policy question in countries, like Norway, where entry into the TV industry is
regulated. In other circumstances, the relevant question may concern a merger between already established
TV channels. When this is the case, the relevant comparison will be between a two-channel TV duopoly
and a two-channel TV monopoly.
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Proposition 5: Comparing TV monopoly and TV duopoly.
Suppose advertising is priced per slot and TV channels, in case of a duopoly, compete in
prices. Then:
 (i) rM > rD;
(ii) qD < qM, and QM < [>] QD, if  d < [>] dQ ≅ 0.59;
(iii) αD < αM, and AM < [>] AD, if  d < [>] dA ≅ 0.48;
(iv) vD < vM, and VM < [>] VD, if d < [>] dV, where 2/5 < dV < 1/2;
(v) HD < HM, and THM < [>] THD, if d < [>] dH ≅ 0.19; and
(vi) πD < πM, and ΠM < [>] ΠD, if d < [>] dΠ ≅ 0.20.
Proof: See the Appendix.
We see, from this Proposition, that the price of advertising is always lower with
duopoly than with monopoly in this TV market. This should be no surprise: The
introduction of a second TV channel results in rivalry on prices.
There are two effects on total investments in programming from adding a second
TV channel. On the one hand, a second channel triggers competition on prices for the
advertising slots and thereby reduces the incentives to invest in programming.  On the
other hand, a second channel introduces a business stealing effect: Higher own
programming investment will not only increase the total number of viewers in the market,
but also shift some viewers from watching the rival’s programs to a channel’s own
programs. We find that the business-stealing effect dominates for sufficiently low values
of d, causing total investment in programming to rise as a result of the introduction of a
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second TV channel. However, each duopoly channel’s investment in programming is
always lower than the monopoly channel’s investment.
The total number of viewers may drop following the introduction of a second TV
channel. To see this, consider the intermediate case of d = 1/2. If now a second channel
enters, its investment in programming merely duplicates the first channel’s investment,
seen from the viewers’ point of view. If d = 1/2, and the entering channel has the same
programming investment and advertising amount as the incumbent, then the entry of a
new channel does not affect the total number of TV viewers. In such a case, therefore,
total programming investment in the industry must be more than doubled following the
introduction of a second channel for the number of viewers to increase. However, each
duopoly channel’s programming investment is lower than that of a monopoly channel in
this case. Therefore, the total number of viewers drops when a second channel enters. On
the other hand, if the second channel is independent of the first channel (d = 0), it is as if
you have two monopoly channel, and the introduction of a second channel will surely
increase the total number of viewers. By continuity, then, there must be some critical
value of d between 0 and 1/2 at which the total number of viewers is equal among
monopoly and duopoly. The Proposition above finds that this critical value, which
depends on n, the number of advertisers, is somewhere between 2/5 and 1/2.
Surprisingly, the total spending on advertising may drop when a second TV
channel is introduced. All else equal, a lower price per advertising slot will result in more
advertising. On the other hand, as explained above, the total number of viewers may drop
as a result of entry. If d is sufficiently high, then the reduction in the total number of
viewers is so large that it offsets the effect of lower price on advertising.
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Finally, we see that, even if total investment in programming increases and price
per advertising slot drops as a result of an introduction of a second TV channel, producers
may be better off with a monopoly than with a duopoly in the TV industry. Interestingly,
this occurs when the viewers are sufficiently prone to switch channels (a high d). When
this is the case, the number of viewers on each of the two channels is low, and therefore
the producers advertise less. Despite a lower advertising price when the TV channels are
close substitutes, the combined effect is a preference for a TV monopoly among
advertising firms, even at a modest degree of channel substitutability. The driving force is
the reduction in the number of viewers following a transition from a monopoly to a
duopoly TV industry.
4. THE PRODUCT MARKETS
Let us now extend the basic model to take into account the rivalry in the product markets.
We assume that all product markets are identical, with the same demand conditions and
the same number of producers. In the next Section, we relax this assumption by letting
product markets differ with respect to the number of firms.
There are a total of m product markets, with f firms in each, m ≥ 1 and f ≥ 2, so
that the total number of advertisers is: n = mf. Furthermore, we assume that the products
sold in each market are identical, and we let p denote the price per unit. By way of
normalization, we set production costs equal to zero.
In general, both price and advertising are expected to affect sales in the product
market: A price reduction expands sales, and so does an increase in advertising.
However, it is not obvious how price and advertising interact. On the one hand,
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advertising may increase each existing consumer’s loyalty to one's product, or increase
the number of loyal consumers relative to that of other consumers. If so, a producer’s
optimal response to more own advertising may be to raise price to exploit the loyal
consumers. On the other hand, advertising makes consumers aware of one's product. To
the extent this is the case, we may observe more intense rivalry on prices because the
informed consumers are able to pick from all those offers that they are aware of. Hence,
in theory, advertising has an ambiguous effect on prices. Empirical studies report
ambiguous effects of advertising as well.18 We side-step from the question of whether
advertising has a price-increasing or price-reducing effect by developing here a model
where a firm's advertising in equilibrium affects its sales only, not the price.
Although prices are not affected by the amount of advertising, the number of
firms in the product market may affect product prices. We find it difficult to argue that
one particular price regime is more plausible than any other regime. Therefore, we
investigate two different price regimes: Cournot competition, and collusion on prices
(semi-collusion). As it turns out, those two regimes are sufficient to show that the market
outcome depends crucially on the toughness of price competition.19
                                                          
18Eckard (1991) studies the effect of the 1970 ban on TV advertising for cigarettes in the US and concludes
that the ban had an anti-competitive effect, implying that TV advertising as such would have increased
price rivalry. Also Leahy (1991) reports a negative relation between TV advertising and prices. Kanetkar,
et al. (1992) examine how TV advertising affects consumers’ price sensitivity for two frequently purchased
consumer goods. They find that, for high levels of advertising exposure, price sensitivity drops, while the
opposite is true for lower levels of advertising exposure. This implies that, at high levels of TV advertising,
further advertising dampens price competition, while the opposite is true for lower levels. According to
their study, then, there is a U-shaped relation between the level of advertising and the product price.
Moreover, studies of advertising in general find ambiguous results as well. See, for example, Vakratsas and
Ambler (1999) for a review of the marketing literature.
19Our modeling approach shares some similarities with Schmalensee (1992), who develops two simple
models complementing the analytical framework introduced in Sutton (1991). He does not insist on a
particular price regime. In one model, he uses a parameter to capture the degree of price competition. In
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Cournot competition
Each viewer of channel k has the following individual inverse demand in each product
market:
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where yik is the per-capita quantity offered by firm i to viewers of channel k, with Yk :=
∑i iky  being the total sales in each product market. The parameter B can be interpreted
as a scale parameter. Recall that aik denotes producer i's advertising on channel k.
With this formulation, we allow for prices offered to consumers to differ
according to which TV channel the consumers are viewing. We also allow a firm's
advertising to affect demand: The more a producer advertises, the less sensitive is the
market price to an increase in its offered quantity. However, despite the heterogeneity
created in cases of asymmetric advertising, the product sold in this market is
homogeneous, in the sense that there is one price per market segment for all firms.
Firm i's per-capita profit, gross of advertising costs, equals pkyik among channel
k's viewers, since production costs are assumed to be zero. This gives rise to the
following first-order condition for firm i with respect to its offered quantity:
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Summing over all f firms' first-order conditions in each market, we obtain:
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another model, he solves the model assuming collusive prices, and then shows that his result still holds if
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implying that, in equilibrium,
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Thus, the equilibrium price in each market does not depend on how much firms advertise
or which channel consumers are viewing:
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There are two effects of a firm's advertising: Its sales increases, leading to an
increase in total sales and thus a reduction in price. But this, in turn, entails a reduction in
the sales of rival firms, which leads to an increase in price. The two effects balance each
other off exactly in this particular model.
The above expression may be inserted in each firm's first-order condition to
obtain the firm's equilibrium per-capita sales among viewers of channel k:
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The per-capita gross profits of firm i among the viewers of channel k amount to:
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Thus, K, the marginal gross profits per viewer with respect to a firm's advertising, is a
specific decreasing function of the number for firms in the product market.
We are now in a position to investigate how the equilibrium outcome is affected
by a change in the number of advertisers, n.  This number may increase, either through an
                                                                                                                                                                            
price is below the collusive level.
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increase in the number of firms in each market, i.e., a decrease in market concentration
throughout the economy, or through an increase in the number of product markets.
Proposition 6: The effect of changing the number of advertisers: Cournot competition.
Suppose advertising is priced per slot, that TV channels compete in prices if there is a TV
duopoly, and that each advertiser competes in quantities with other advertisers in the
same product market. Then equilibrium variables in the market for TV advertising
decrease if the number of firms in each product market, f, increases, and increase if the
number of product markets, m, increases:
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where x ∈ {rs, qs, αs, vs, Hs, πs}, and s ∈ {M, D}.
Proof: In the equilibrium values shown in Proposition A1(i), in the Appendix, we
substitute: K = B/(f + 1)2, and n = mf.  Now, the results can easily be verified. QED.
According to this Proposition, total spending on advertising increases as a result
of a reduction in the number of firms, keeping constant the number of product markets.
Note that there are two opposing forces at work. On the one hand, a reduction in the
number of firms makes each remaining firm more concerned about the fact that own
advertising tends to reduce the number of viewers. This dampens the incentive for each
firm to increase advertising, and would all else equal result in a reduction in total
advertising. On the other hand, fewer firms result in a higher price-cost margin. This
would encourage firms to advertise more. The latter effect turns out to dominate, and it is
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reinforced by the TV channels’ responses. They invest more in programming, thereby
attracting more viewers and even more advertising.  The result is that both total
advertising and total investment in programming increase following a reduction in the
number of firms.
Note also that the total number of viewers increases following a reduction in the
number of firms. Since advertising increases as well, which tends to reduce the number of
viewers, the driving force behind this result is the TV channel’s increased investment in
programming. Finally, note that the price per advertising slot also increases. This follows
directly from the fact each TV channel’s two choice variables mutually reinforce each
other (see Proposition 3).
However, total spending on advertising can also increase as a result of an increase
in the number of advertising firms, if this latter increase is solely due to an increase in the
number of product markets. In such a case, price-cost margins are unaffected by a change
in the number of firms. Now, an increase in the number of firms makes each firm less
concerned about own advertising’s effect on the number of viewers. This spurs an
increase in total advertising. Again, the TV channels’ response reinforces the initial
effect. They invest more in programming, thereby increasing the total advertising even
more.
Semi-collusion
Suppose now that firms collude on prices at stage 4. The collusion is restricted to the
pricing, though; thus, ours is a case of semi-collusion, with firms colluding on price while
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behaving non-cooperatively in their stage-2 advertising decisions, foreseeing the
collusion in price further on.20
Suppose each viewer on channel k has the following demand function:
Yk = (1 - p)Bαk (14)
where, as above, αk is total advertising on channel k and B is a scale parameter.
Maximizing their total profits pYk on each viewer, the colluding firms set p = 1/2, so that
pYk = Bαk/4.  Note that the collusive price at stage 4 is independent of the amount of
advertising. The sale of each firm is assumed to be determined by its amount of
advertising. In particular, we assume that each member of the colluding group of firms
obtains a market share equal to its share of total advertising. It follows that, in this case of
semi-collusion, Zik = Baik/4. Thus, K = B/4; i.e., the marginal gross profit from advertising
is now independent to the number of firms in each market, contrary to the case of
Cournot competition above. We have:
Proposition 7: The effect of changing the number of advertisers: Semi-collusion.
Consider the same situation as in Proposition 6, except that the product markets are
characterized by semi-collusion, as outlined above. In this case, the effect of an increase
in the number of advertiser is to increase equilibrium variables in the market for TV,
irrespective of whether it is the number of firms in each product market, f, or the number
of product markets, m, that increases:
                                                          
20Since prices are more flexible than most other choice variables, it is easier to collude on prices than on
other variables. Therefore, most of the literature on semi-collusion assumes collusion on prices and
competition along another dimension, such as for example advertising, capacity, or location.  For a review
of the semi-collusion literature, see Phlips (1995).
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where x ∈ {rs, qs, αs, vs, Hs, πs}, and s ∈ {M, D}.
Proof: In this case, K is substituted with B/4, and, as in the case of Proposition 6, n is
substituted with mf in the equilibrium values in Proposition A1(i), in the Appendix. The
results are now easily verified. QED.
The results concerning f, the number of firms in each market, are now reversed
compared to the case of Cournot competition. A reduction in the number of firms results
in lower prices on advertising, less total advertising, less investment in programming, and
fewer viewers. The main distinction between this pricing regime and Cournot
competition is that, now, product prices are unaffected by a reduction in the number of
firms. The incentive to increase advertising and, in turn, sales, due to higher product
prices, is no longer present. The driving force now is that fewer firms result in less
intense rivalry on advertising.  A reduction in the amount of advertising dampens the TV
channels’ incentives to invest in programming. To prevent a substantial reduction in the
amount of advertising, the TV channels set a lower price on each advertising slot. Both
prices and quantities of advertising drop as a result of a reduction in the number of firms.
Note also that a lower investment in programming reduces the number of viewers, despite
the fact that the amount of advertising also is lower.
Finally, let us examine how the toughness of price competition affects the market
outcome. We do this by comparing our two cases of Cournot competition and semi-
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collusion. Let superscripts S and C denote the semi-collusion and Cournot regime,
respectively.
Proposition 8: The toughness of price competition
All equilibrium values are higher with semi-collusion than with Cournot:
CS xx >
where x ∈ {rs, qs, αs, vs, Hs, πs}, and s ∈ {M, D}.
Proof: K enters as a multiplicative term in all the equilibrium values in Proposition A1(i)
in the Appendix. We know that K = B/(1+f)2 with Cournot competition and K = B/4 with
semi-collusion. It follows straightforwardly that the equilibrium values are always higher
with semi-collusion than with Cournot competition, since f ≥ 2. QED.
There is a larger profit potential in the product market under collusive price
setting than under Cournot competition.  Each TV channel exploits this by setting a
higher price per slot of advertising, and by increasing its investment in programming,
thereby attracting more viewers.
Also advertising is higher under price collusion than what is the case when
Cournot competition prevails. This is not obvious. In a TV duopoly, price collusion
results in more investment in programming and a higher price of advertising.
Programming and the price of advertising have opposite effects on each producer’s
choice concerning the amount of advertising.  Since we find that less rivalry on prices in
the product market results in more spending on advertising, it shows that the effect of
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higher price on each advertising slot is not large enough to offset the effect of more
investment in programming.
Note also that the number of viewers is higher under price collusion than under
Cournot competition. There is more advertising in semi-collusion, which tends to reduce
the number of viewers. On the other hand, the large investment in programming in
collusion attracts viewers. According to the Proposition, the latter effect dominates.
The results reported here indicate that there are two successive battles over profit
potentials in the product markets, and that these two battles may mutually reinforce each
other. An escalation of advertising by the producers spurs more investment in
programming, and vice versa.
5. WHO ARE THE ADVERTISERS?
In reality, of course, the product markets that advertising firms operate in differ,
particularly with respect to their profitability. In order to get an understanding of the
importance of this asymmetry, we extend our model to consider a case of two product
markets, with marginal gross profits K1 and K2, respectively, and with the numbers of
firms equal to f1 and f2. Thus, the total number of advertising firms is n = f1 + f2.
We continue our focus on the case of advertising being priced per slot and TV
channels competing in prices. In addition, we now concentrate on the case of a TV
duopoly. At stage 2, solving for the firms' demand for advertising in the two channels,
invoking symmetry among firms in each market, involves a system of four equations. Let
now aik denote the amount of advertising on channel k demanded by each firm in market
i, i, k ∈ {1, 2}. Under the assumption that all firms advertise in equilibrium, we find:
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i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i ≠ j, k, h ∈ {1, 2}, k ≠ h.
In the symmetric case of f1 = f2 and K1 = K2, we are back to equation (4).
Interestingly, asymmetry may cause firms in one of the markets to have a demand
for advertising that is increasing in price. An inspection of the above expression reveals
that this happens for firms in market i when
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The right-hand side of this condition is greater than 1. Advertising can therefore only
increase in price among firms in the more profitable product market, and it will always be
decreasing in price in the other market. Thus, the firms in the less profitable product
market invariably respond to a price increase with a decrease in their advertising demand.
This decrease reduces the congestion of advertising on the TV channels, since this
reduced advertising attracts more viewers. If the firms in the more profitable product
market have a sufficiently high profitability relative to the other firms, then the negative
impact of a price increase is more than compensated by the increased inflow of viewers
following the other firms' reduction in advertising.
As the above condition indicates, there does not have to be much asymmetry
between the product markets for this phenomenon to occur. In order to be specific, let us
consider the case of Cournot competition, in which Ki = B/(fi +1)
2, i ∈ {1, 2}. We have:
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Proposition 9: Who are the advertisers?
Suppose advertising is priced per slot, and that there are two TV channels competing in
prices. There are two product markets, with f1 and f2 firms each, respectively, and
Cournot competition in each market. If f1 > f2, so that market 2 is the more concentrated
one, then:
(i) Conditioned on all firms advertising, the demand for advertising is
decreasing in price in market 1 but increasing in price in market 2.
(ii) In equilibrium, only firms in the more concentrated market 2 advertise.
Proof: (i) The demand for advertising on channel k from each firm in market i now
becomes, from (15):
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i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i ≠ j; k, h ∈ {1, 2}, k ≠ h.
Inspection of the square-bracketed term in this expression reveals that advertising
demand among firms in market i is decreasing in price if fi ≥ fj, but is increasing if fi < fj, i
≠ j. Of course, f1 and f2 can only take integer values. What need to be checked, therefore,
is that the expression within square brackets is positive for f1 ≥ f2 but negative for f1 ≤ f2 −
1. As long as there is any asymmetry among the two markets, therefore, the firms in the
more concentrated market have a demand for advertising that is increasing in price.
(ii) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that all firms advertise in equilibrium.
In stage 1, TV channels determine advertising prices and investments in program quality.
Channel k now maximizes:
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with a1k and a2k given in (16). Solving for the equilibrium values, still under the
assumption that all firms advertise in equilibrium, we have:
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Inserting these values back into the expression for the advertising by each firm in market
i, we obtain (dropping the subscript k because of symmetry):
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We can again make use of f1 and f2 being integers: While the above expression is clearly
positive if fj ≥ fi, it is negative for any combination of fs such that fj ≤ fi − 1. It suffices to
show that the expression is negative for f1 = f and f2 = f − 1. Substituting this into the
crucial square-bracketed term in the numerator of the expression in (17), we find that the
latter now equals − f[f(2f + 1)(2d + 1) − 1], which is negative for any f ≥ 1. Since
advertising cannot be negative, the above cannot be an equilibrium, except in the
symmetric case. QED.
The firms in the product market with many firms choose not advertise in
equilibrium. The driving force is that the product price is lower in the market with many
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firms, and those firms generate a lower revenue from advertising on TV than what is the
case for the firms in the product market with few firms. The firms in the market with
many firms respond to an increase in the price of advertising by reducing their demand
for advertising. This reduces the congestion of advertising on TV and attracts new
viewers. More viewers induce the firms in the market with few firms to advertise more.
The TV channels exploit the ‘perverse’ demand curve by those firms by increasing its
price of advertising. In equilibrium, the price of advertising is set so high that the firms in
the market with many firms decide not to advertise at all.
The result, although merely suggestive in nature, highlights an important aspect of
the link between the market for viewers, the market for TV advertising, and the product
markets: When viewers dislike advertising, there are negative externalities among
advertisers. These negative externalities may magnify even small asymmetries among
advertisers to such an extent that only the more profitable ones find it in their interest to
do any advertising.
Descriptive data suggests that few product categories dominate the market for TV
advertising. For example, in the US in 1999 the TV advertising for automobiles accounts
for almost one fifth of all advertising on TV. The TV advertising for the top six product
categories adds up to more than half of all TV advertising.21 Firm-specific data for the US
further illustrates the high concentration in the market for TV advertising. The top 10
advertisers account for 25 % of total advertising on network TV and 16 % of total
advertising on spot TV.22 In other countries it might be even higher concentration in the
                                                          
21The figures are calculated from the data on www.adage.com/dataplace/archives/dp394.html.
22The figures reported here are calculated from the data on www.adage.com/dataplace/archives/dp385.html
and www.adage.com/dataplace/archives/dp386.html.
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TV advertising market. In Norway, for example, two corporations had in 1999 almost
half the total TV advertising on TV2, the dominant TV-advertising channel.23
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite its obvious importance, there are surprisingly few studies in the economics
literature of the TV industry. In particular, there are few studies of the two-fold role of
the TV industry as both a provider of entertainment and a transmitter of advertising. To
help fill this gap, we have presented a stylized model that encompasses some of the TV
industry’s idiosyncratic characteristics. Most importantly, we assume that viewers are
attracted by TV channels' investments in programming but dislike their advertising, and
we model advertising as a link between the product markets and the TV market.
Since the TV industry has some idiosyncratic features, it is of interest to elaborate
on some of the basic mechanisms that are in force. It turns out that the strategic
interaction in this particular industry can be distinctly different from other industries. For
example, we find that advertising prices are strategic substitutes when advertising is
priced per slot. Moreover, we find that price, instead of quantity, as a choice variable can
trigger more intense rivalry on programming but less intense rivalry on prices of
advertising. This suggests that one should be careful with applying standard IO results to
the TV industry, but rather draw conclusions only from models that are tailor-made for it.
We have applied our model to three different issues, the first one being how
rivalry in the TV market affects the market outcome. By comparing monopoly and
duopoly in the TV market, we found that rivalry between TV channels can lead to a
                                                          
23They are Orkla and Landbruket, both selling food and other consumer goods products. The figure is
reported in the Norwegian journal Propaganda; see http://www.propaganda-as.no/tekst.cfm?id =9420.
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reduction in the total number of viewers. The reason is that the TV channels partly
duplicate each other's programming investments, and each duopoly TV channel invests
less in programming than a monopoly TV channel. If the viewers’ propensity to switch
TV channels is high enough, then the total increase in the investment in programming is
not large enough to offset the duplication of programming investments among the TV
channels, and the number of viewers drops. The amount of advertising may drop as well.
This happens if the effect on advertising of a reduction in the number of viewers offsets
the effect of a reduction in the prices of advertising slots.
The second issue is how product-market competition affects the equilibrium
outcome. We showed that the profit potential in the product market is of importance for
the amount of programming investments as well as for the amount of advertising and the
price per advertising slot. The less intense product-price rivalry is, the larger is the
potential revenue generated by advertising. A TV channel exploits this in two ways. First,
it sets a higher price per slot of advertising. Second, it invests more in programming to
attract more viewers and thereby to encourage the producers to advertise more. As a
result, a relaxation of price competition in the product markets results in higher prices of
advertising, more advertising, and more investment in programming. This suggests that
there are two successive battles over the profit potential in the product markets. An
escalation of advertising by the producers spurs more investment in programming, and
vice versa.
Product market competition may also be affected by a change in the number of
firms. We found that the effect of increasing the number of advertising firms depends on
whether the increase is by increasing the number of firms in each market, making the
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markets less concentrated, or by increasing the number of markets. The former way of
increasing the number of advertising firms reduces the price-cost margin and thereby the
profit potential in the product markets. Thus, while there now are more firms demanding
advertising, they also earn less from advertising. When firms compete a la Cournot in the
product market, we find that the latter effect dominates. In that case, total advertising
drops when the number of firms in each market increases. We showed that the investment
in programming drops as well, something that, in turn, reduces the number of viewers.
The result with Cournot competition is reversed if the firms in each market are
able to collude on price, and/or if the number of advertising firms increase through an
increase in the number of product markets. In those two cases, there are no price effect in
the product market due to a change in the number of firms. More firms would then trigger
more intense rivalry on advertising, increasing the total amount of advertising.
Our third and final issue is how asymmetries between product markets affect the
equilibrium outcome. We found that even small asymmetries may have dramatic effects.
In the case of two identical product markets where one product market has more firms
than the other and Cournot competition prevails, the firms in the product market with
many firms choose not to advertise. The crucial feature of our model producing this result
is that TV viewers dislike advertising, entailing congestion among advertisers. At an
increase in the price of advertising, the firms in the market with many firms would, as
expected, reduce their demand for advertising. This would, in turn, reduce the congestion
of advertising on TV and thereby attract more viewers. The firms in the market with few
firms would respond to an increase in the number of viewers by increasing their demand
for advertising, despite the price of advertising having increased. The TV channels
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exploit those firms’ ‘perverse’ demand by increasing their price so that, in equilibrium,
the firms in the market with many firms decide not to advertise at all on TV.
A topic left unexplored in this paper is the welfare properties of an unregulated
market for TV advertising and how, if necessary, regulation should be done. In Norway
and France, for example, there are regulations on the amount of TV commercials.24 In the
U.S., there used to be a similar regulation, self-imposed by the TV industry itself, through
the National Association of Broadcasters. In the early 1980's, however, the U.S.
Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit against the N.A.B. code, and its restrictions
on the amount of TV advertising was lifted.25 As far as we know, Anderson and Coate
(2000) and Gabszewicz et al. (2000) are the only studies that discuss the question
whether there is too much or too little TV advertising. Because we feel that aspects of TV
advertising left out of their analysis, such as the roles of programming investments and
advertisers’ profits, we believe applying our model to the welfare issue would provide
more insight into the question whether an unregulated market for TV advertising provides
an efficient outcome.
APPENDIX
Proposition A1: Equilibrium outcomes in TV duopoly.
(i) If advertising is priced per slot and TV channels compete in prices, then the
equilibrium outcome is given by:
                                                          
24In Norway, TV commercials are restricted to a maximum of 12 minutes per hour and to a maximum of
15% of daily transmission time. There are also restrictions on how various programs can be interrupted by
commercial breaks (see http://www.smf.no/4.2.0.asp for details). In France, TV commercials are also
restricted to a maximum of 12 minutes per hour (Desmoulins, 1998).
25U.S. v. National Association of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621 (1982). Descriptions of the case can be
found in Hull (1990) and Owen and Wildman (1992, ch. 5).
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(ii) If advertising is priced per slot and TV channels compete in quantities, then the
equilibrium outcome is given by:
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(iii) If advertising is priced per viewer, then the equilibrium outcome, whether TV
channels compete in prices or in quantities, is given by:
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Proof of Proposition 5: By differentiations in the expressions in Proposition A1(i), we
obtain:
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Since monopoly corresponds to a duopoly with d = 0, the inequality in part (i) and the
first inequality in each of parts of (ii)-(vi) follow from the above expressions.
Furthermore, using the expressions in Proposition A1(i), we have that:
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Recall from the above that XD is decreasing in d for all d ∈ (0, 1) and for X ∈ {Q, A, V,
TH, Π}. Since the monopoly variables are independent of d, there is therefore at most one
value of d ∈ (0, 1) for which each difference is zero, and if such a critical value exists,
then the difference is negative for d below this value and positive above it. QED.
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